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Abstract—Security evaluation according to ISO 15408 (Com-
mon Criteria) is a resource and time demanding activity, as well
as being costly. For this reason, only few companies take their
products through a Common Criteria evaluation. To support
security evaluation, the European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI) has developed a threat, vulnerability, risk analy-
sis (eTVRA) method for the Telecommunication (Telco) domain.
eTVRA builds on the security risk management methodology
CORAS and is structured in such a way that it provides
output that can be directly fed into a Common Criteria security
evaluation.
In this paper, we evaluate the time and resource efficiency
of parts of eTVRA and the quality of the result produced by
following eTVRA compared to a more pragmatic approach
(Protection Profile-based checklists). We use both approaches
to identify and analyze risks of a new SIM card currently
under joint development by a small hardware company and a
large Telco provider. The new SIM card should comply with
Evaluation Assurance Level 4 or 4+ according to Common
Criteria.
Keywords: Security evaluation, eTVRA, Common Criteria, risk
assessment, risk management, and security checklists.
I. INTRODUCTION
ISO 15408:2007 Common Criteria for Information Technol-
ogy Security Evaluation [10], here referred to as the Common
Criteria, is tailored for industrial purposes and is the result
of the experience and recommendations of researchers and
experienced developers both within the military sector and
from industry. Common Criteria evaluates the security level of
IT products using a hierarchy of predefined evaluation classes
called Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL). There are seven
such EALs, where EAL 7 provides highest assurance. The
EALs and associated guidelines take an evaluator through
a well-formulated and structured process of assessing the
security of specific parts of (or the complete) IT product to
gain confidence in the security controls of the system.
Common Criteria security evaluation is considered a healthy
approach for tackling the security issues of an IT product, as it
gives detailed guidelines about the procedure to carry it on and
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it describes the activities that developers and security experts
involved (e.g. evaluator) should undertake to ensure that all
relevant security aspects have been addressed. However, a
Common Criteria security evaluation is both costly and time
and resource demanding. Hence, not many companies set aside
budget and time to take their IT products through such a formal
evaluation process. Furthermore, the security guidelines are
not easily accessible for non-security experts (and security
experts are a scarce resource). For this reason, the Telecoms
& Internet converged Services & Protocols for Advanced
Networks (TISPAN) program at European Telecommunica-
tions Standards Institute (ETSI), a major European Telecom-
munication (Telco) standardization organization with world-
wide influence, developed a threat, vulnerability, risk analysis
(eTVRA) method to support Telco companies in a Common
Criteria security evaluation. eTVRA builds on CORAS [14]
and is structured to provide output that can be directly fed
into a security evaluation thus easing the evaluation process.
In this paper we evaluate eTVRA by comparing it to a more
pragmatic approach based on Protection Profile checklists. We
perform the comparison in terms of time, resource efficiency
and quality of the results. We also evaluate the efficiency of
eTVRA in a value-web context, to identify and analyze risks of
a new SIM card currently under development in collaboration
between a small hardware company and a large Telco provider.
The goal for the new SIM card is to comply with EAL 4
or 4+ according to Common Criteria. Finally, we report on
lessons learnt from applying an extended version of eTVRA.
Based on experience from earlier assessments at ETSI [21], we
extended eTVRA by adding to it a sub-process of the CORAS
methodology to compensate the fact that eTVRA does not
include context identification activities. Context identification
is critical to produce precise risk assessment results.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section II we provide
background information on CORAS, eTVRA and value-webs.
In Section III we give the industrial context. In Section IV we
describe the methodology that we used to identify and analyze
risks to the new SIM technology. In Section V we present the
pragmatic approach based on checklists, and in Section VI
we compare it with the extended eTVRA methodology. In
Section VII we draw the lessons learned by using eTVRA in
a value-web context. Finally, in Section VIII we conclude the
paper and give directions for future work.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A. CORAS
CORAS [14] is a framework for model-based risk assess-
ment of security critical systems. It consists of four main
components as shown in Figure 1: (1) a risk documentation
framework based on RM-ODP [1]; (2) a risk management
process based on the AS/NZS 4360 [17]; (3) an integrated
risk management and system development process based on
the Unified Process [16] and (4) a platform for tool inclusion
based on data-integration using XML. [14]
Fig. 1. The five main components of the CORAS framework.
The CORAS framework is model-based in the sense that it
gives detailed recommendations for modeling the system and
the risk, as well as security controls identified during the risk
assessment using UML. Furthermore, CORAS is asset-driven,
which means that the identification of assets is the driving task
of the risk assessment process [14].
The CORAS risk management process comprises five se-
quential risk assessment sub-processes and two management
sub-processes running in parallel (see Fig. 2).
The five risk assessment processes are:
1) Context Identification
2) Risk Identification
3) Risk Analysis
4) Risk Evaluation
5) Risk Treatment
B. eTVRA
Threat, Vulnerability and Risk Assessment (eTVRA) [19]
is based on component 2 of CORAS and refines the risk
management process developed by ETSI for risk assessment
of Telco standardization projects.
The process of eTVRA consists of 7 steps [20]:
1) Identify security objectives
Fig. 2. CORAS sub-processes
Fig. 3. Steps of eTVRA
2) Identify security requirements
3) Inventory of assets
4) Identification and classification of vulnerabilities, threats
and unwanted incidents
5) Quantifying the occurrence likelihood and impact of
threats
6) Establishment of risk
7) Identification of countermeasures
eTVRA aims at analyzing the threats, identifying the best
set of countermeasures and reduce the overall risk. The process
starts with identification of the security objectives of a system
or a system component, out of which security requirements
are extracted. Later an inventory of the assets in the system
is drafted. The purpose of using the eTVRA is to be able to
identify vulnerabilities that exist in the system. Therefore, after
identifying assets and their vulnerabilities, threats that exploit
those vulnerabilities and cause incidents are determined. The
security requirements and the threats are then extended ac-
cording to threats and vulnerabilities. Then, the occurrence
likelihood of the threats and their impact is analyzed and
quantified. This is used in the following step to calculate the
risk. Consequently, the countermeasures for treating the risk
are identified. This process is applied iteratively, until the risk
of unwanted incidents is reduced to an acceptable level, or
whenever there are changes in the environment [19].
eTVRA encapsulates the relevant parts of Common Criteria
and aims at producing high-quality input to a Common Criteria
Security Evaluation. Below we provide more details on this in
the sequel.
eTVRA is developed mainly for security standardization.
Therefore, it considers only the technical vulnerabilities and
countermeasures: the business impact of security breaches is
as usual outside the scope of the standards.
C. Value Webs
A value-web [5] consists of a set of profit and loss responsi-
ble actors that cooperate to realize a common goal. The actors
can be independent companies or even business units of a
holding. A value-web produces either a product or a service of
some value. Some of the most commonly build value-webs are
marriages, outsourcing, insurance and contractor relationships.
The main challenge of constructing and protecting value-
webs is that the web should be profitable for each of the actors.
To evaluate the effects of value-webs on a risk assessment,
the following evaluation criteria should be considered: (1) goal
of each actor, (2) available resources, (3) confidentiality of
business critical information, (4) communication of confiden-
tial information, and (5) coordination of the responsibilities of
the actors.
III. INDUSTRIAL CONTEXT
The industrial context in this paper consists of two European
companies, which collaborate as a value-web in the Telco
domain. Together, they have developed the world’s first GSM
SIM card with embedded radio capabilities (802.11b). The
two companies are a small hardware producer, which is new
to the Telco market, and a large European Telco provider
that is already a major player in the field. The distribution
of responsibility within the development project is that the
hardware producer designs and produces the IC technology
and its firmware, while the large Telco company implements
the software layer between the firmware and the operating
system as well as the value-added service running on top of
the operating system.
One of the possible application areas for this new SIM
card is automatic meter reading (AMR). AMR refers to the
technology used for automatically collecting data from meter-
ing devices (e.g. water, gas, and electricity) and transferring
readings to a central database for billing and analysis. In this
context, a SIM card with wireless capabilities will reduce the
number of terminals necessary to report the readings, hence
saving a substantial amount of money. To limit the scope of
the assessment and to make it feasible to do an evaluation
between eTVRA and a checklist-based approach, we focused
on the security of the new SIM technology in the context of
AMR and on how to produce high-quality input to a future
Common Criteria evaluation.
IV. METHODOLOGY
We evaluated the efficiency and result quality of two risk
assessment approaches; (1) extended eTVRA and (2) Protec-
tion Profile-based checklists, as input to Common Criteria
security evaluation. Here, we describe the two approaches
and document the changes we made to eTVRA and the risk
identification and risk analysis methods that we used to support
the relevant activities of eTVRA, as eTVRA does not give
concrete guidelines as such.
Fig. 4 gives an overview of the extended eTVRA. The main
changes we made consist in adding the context identification
step taken from CORAS as well as concrete guidelines for
methodologies to use for risk identification and risk analysis.
The figure illustrates, besides the process flow, the information
we used as input to the different steps involved, the informa-
tion delivered as output of the steps and the methodologies that
we used as support in producing the outputs. The extensions
made to eTVRA come as a response to the earlier identified
deficiency of eTVRA 1.
A. Step 1: Context Identification
Earlier case studies of eTVRA at ETSI have shown that
“context identification” is critical for producing more precise
results 2. As eTVRA does not include any specific context
identification activities, we extended eTVRA with the context
identification sub-process of CORAS. The aim of this sub-
process is to describe the IT product to be assessed and its
environment.
We used a Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities and Threats
(SWOT) analysis [6] as information gathering tool to identify
the scope of the risk assessment and to ensure that the two
stakeholders involved agreed on the goal and the objective of
the assessment.
To prepare for and to carry out an effective SWOT session
we referred to the case scenario documentation. Then, we
(the risk analysts), together with the product owner (the two
stakeholders in the value-web), went through the current case
scenario document and made sure that we had a common
1Please contact the authors for details. This is documented in an ETSI report
which is internal to ETSI members. It has thus far not been made publicly
available.
2Please contact the authors for details.
Fig. 4. Extended eTVRA and the supporting methodologies that we used with input and output documents.
understanding of the assessment context and of the role of
the SIM card in an AMR setting.
The SWOT analysis helped us to determine the scope of the
assessment and to focus the following assessment activities. In
addition to SWOT, we carried out semi-structured interviews
with both stakeholders. During the semi-structured interviews
we agreed with the stakeholders on the functional components
of the AMR deployment scenario which we previously ex-
tracted from the case scenario documentation.
The result of this step is documented in a context identifi-
cation document, which consisted of the case description (in-
cluding the deployment scenario), the functional components,
the reference architecture and the scope of the assessment.
B. Step 2: Security Objective and Requirement Identification
The first step of eTVRA is the specification of security
objectives and the identification of security requirements.
From this step on, we used the eTVRA process as described
in [20].
To establish the security objectives we based ourselves on
the output of the previous step; namely the SWOT-Analysis
and the semi-structured interviews, as reported in the context
identification document.
We divided the security objectives of the new SIM technol-
ogy into security objectives of the assets and security objec-
tives of the environment. We then combined them and defined
new security objectives for the desired level of confidentiality,
integrity, availability, authentication and authorization for the
assets involved.
These security objectives were high-level, e.g. “The new
SIM technology should ensure continues and correct operation
of its core functionality and availability to authorized use upon
request.”, so for operability reasons they had to be refined
into security requirements. Security requirements describe the
details of how the security objective will be achieved.
We listed both security requirements and security objectives
in a document called the Target of Evaluation (ToE) document.
This document was then extended with the context identifica-
tion descriptions from the previous step and then given to the
two stakeholders in the value-web for approval.
C. Step 3: Asset Inventory
In this step we used the information gathered in Step 1 and
2 as input. First, we had to complete the draft-list of assets
that came out of the semi-structural interviews with the two
stakeholders as described in Section IV-A.
For the interview with the large Telco company we used the
reference architecture as input and we obtained a list of assets
relevant for the information flow in the AMR case. These
were assets at a high-level of abstraction (e.g. the concentrator
functionality on the SIM card).
The interview with the hardware developer was carried out
as a functional architecture walk-through. This resulted in
assets on the physical and logical layer. We then compared
these assets with the information flow assets and modeled their
internal relations (e.g. dependency and containment relation-
ships). The result of this activity was given as output of Step
3.
D. Step 4: Threat and Vulnerability Identification
eTVRA includes activities to identify threats and vulnera-
bilities but does not provide how-to guidelines (i.e. it does not
provide any method/tool to systematically extract threats and
vulnerabilities). We therefore used the guidelines provided in
CORAS to assist us in Step 4. In particular, we used Security-
HazOp [26] (in CORAS Security-HazOp is referred to as
HazOp) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [18].
Security-HazOp
A Hazard and Operability (HazOp) study [3] is a systematic
analysis of how deviations from intended use of system
components can arise, and whether these deviations can result
in hazards. A hazard is defined in FAA Order 8040.4 [25]
as a “condition, event, or circumstance that could lead to or
contribute to an unplanned or undesirable event”.
Although HazOp has been developed for safety rather than
security, i.e. for industrial processes, notably the chemical,
petrochemical and nuclear industries, experiences over the
years have shown that the basic principle is applicable in
different contexts, such as systems containing programmable
electronics [9]. Security-HazOp [26] is a security specific re-
finement of HazOp which includes security specific constructs.
In general, HazOp is performed by defining a set of guide-
words and attributes and combining them with each other. The
result can be used to describe generic deviations which help in
identifying specific safety related deviations. Security-HazOp
differs from HazOp in the chosen guide-words and attributes.
Srivatanakul et al. [24] criticize Security-HazOp and claim
that the recommended guide-words are not flexible enough to
bring out the analysts’ creativity. We followed some of the
advices in [24] and extended the guide-words of Security-
HazOp to mitigate these limitations. We also took some of
the recommendations given in CORAS for Security-HazOp
and used as input the high-level threats and vulnerabilities dis-
covered during the SWOT-Analysis and from relevant Smart
Card Protection Profile [8].
The approach we used was the following: considering that
more than one guide-word may apply to an asset at one
time, we grouped the guide-words as pre-guide-words and
post-guide-words as recommenced in Security-HazOp. Then,
we used the following notation to generate possible security
incidents: ¡pre-guide-word¿ ¡attribute¿ of ¡component¿ due to
¡post-guide-word¿. In this notation, Pre-Guidewords are the
possible causes of inadequate security attributes, e.g. delib-
erate, unintentional. Attributes are obtained by negating the
security objectives, e.g. manipulation, denial and disclosure.
Components are physical and information assets; and Post-
guide-words are the possible threats, e.g. technical failure or
outsider.
In this way, we obtained a list of 5400 possible incidents,
e.g. “Deliberately disclosure of meter readings due to tech-
nical failure”. As it is not time and resource efficient to
cover these entire incidents in one HazOp-session, we pre-
processed and eliminated possible incidents using the security
objectives identified in Step 2 as filter. The incidents space
sub-set derived from this consisted of 88 possible incidents.
We organized two structured brainstorming sessions: (i) one
session with the large Telco company and (ii) one session
with both stakeholders. During these HazOp sessions, the
RA-leader moderated the debate by using a set of “fault-
statements” derived from the incident sub-set, e.g. unsorted
“How is it possible to deliberately disclose meter readings due
to technical failure?”, to motivate the attendees to structured
thinking. In all cases were potential hazards was detected, the
RA leader followed up by asking questions directed towards
gathering information on its likelihood and its potential busi-
ness impacts. Furthermore, to brighten the perspective of the
attendees but remain passive in generating threats, we also
used a light-weight role-play.
The output of Step 4 was an unsorted and unordered list of
vulnerabilities, threats and potential security incidents.
E. Step 5: Incident Documentation
The unsorted and unordered list produced in Step 4 was
taken as input to Step 5, where the list was ordered and sorted
in terms of cause-consequence relationships. We used FTA
[18] to support us in this activity.
Fig. 5. Part of the FTA that resulted from the HazOp brainstorming session.
FTA
According to [17], a “fault” is an abnormal condition that
may cause a reduction in, or loss of, the capability of a
functional unit to perform a required function. FTA is a
system engineering method, which is mainly used in the
safety domain. It represents, from the system point of view,
the logical combinations of various system states, faults, and
possible causes which can contribute to a top event (specified
event). Security techniques, such as Threat Trees and Attack
Trees originate from FTA [18].
We used the Fault Trees to illustrate at high-level threat-
vulnerability pairs. Furthermore, we linked the incidents to
each other with respect to their dependencies, e.g., if an
incident a is a precondition for an incident b then we inserted
incident a below incident b and indicated the relation with
an arrow. Moreover, we differentiated between AND and OR
causal relations. A small part of one of the resulting fault trees
is shown in Fig. 5.
Finally, we communicated the fault tree and the derived
incident scenarios to the asset owners. The goal of this activity
was to communicate and consolidate our findings and to gather
additional information on the likelihood and consequence
evaluation.
Currently, we are in the process of gathering likelihood and
consequence of the identified threats. This activity is carried
out by the two stakeholders in the value-web. The remaining
processes (Steps 5, 6 and 7 of eTVRA) are going to be carried
out when the likelihood and consequence evaluation is finished
at the end of 2008.
V. ALTERNATIVE METHODOLOGY: SECURITY CHECKLISTS
FROM SMARTCARD PROTECTION PROFILES
In parallel to analyzing risks according to the extended
eTVRA, we employed a more pragmatic (i.e. less time
consuming) approach. We call this approach the PP-based
approach or the security checklist from relevant PPs approach.
This approach requires almost no interaction with the main
stakeholders for threat identification as the possible threats are
extracted from an existing Common Criteria PP for
SmartCards [8]. The approach consists of four steps:
1) Description of the risk assessment object and its security
environment.
2) Specification of the security functional requirements.
3) Identification of the threat-vulnerability pairs and their
impact.
4) Risk analysis, prioritization and documentation.
Steps 1 and 2
Step 1 of this approach is similar to Step 1 of the extended
eTVRA described in the previous section.
The security environment of the new SIM card for the
AMR scenario includes (1) the assets to be protected and (2)
the threat agents with their abilities to reach and exploit the
assessment object or/and its environment during a reasonable
product life-time (which is from product release to major
natural update). To describe the security environment in this
approach, we used the documentation provided in Step 1 of
the extended eTVRA. According to the results of the semi-
structured interviews, we classified the components of the new
SIM card in the context of the AMR scenario into physical and
logical components. We further classified physical components
according to how they interact with the external environment
(e.g. wireless connection, serial connection, etc.). This clas-
sification is useful to clarify the main attack points of each
component (e.g. a certain component may be attacked only
through the wireless interface).
Step 3
The third step in this approach is performed off-line, that is
without interacting with the stakeholders.
We made a selection of the threats enumerated in the
relevant Common Criteria PP [8]. The selection criteria we
adopted were based on: (i) whether the threat agent fits in
the usage scope of the new SIM card (e.g. terrorism is not a
credible threat agent for the AMR scenario) and (ii) whether
the threat can be perpetrated by means of the components of
the new SIM card (i.e. if it exists a component in the new
SIM card which can be targeted by the threat). As the new
SIM card also contains several components which are not part
of a standard SmartCard (e.g. a wireless interface), the threat
list provided in [8] covers only partly the range of possible
threats. To fill this gap we included additional threats collected
during a literature search [4], [15], [2], [23], [7].
Following [8] threats are characterized by a threat agent, a
threat scenario, a set of vulnerabilities enabling the threat and
one or more assets targeted by the threat. The threat list can
be summarized as follows:
• Threats associated with physical attacks
• Threats associated with logical attacks
• Threats associated with access control
• Threats associated with unanticipated interactions
• Threats regarding cryptographic functions
• Threats of information monitoring
• Threats addressed by the operating environment
• Miscellaneous threats
To be able to build a hierarchy among the threats, which
in turn is needed to prioritize threats in the fourth step
of this approach, we additionally grouped threats according
to the relevant security properties confidentiality, integrity
and availability. The five resulting threat categories are: (1)
unauthorized disclosure of assets, (2) theft or unauthorized use
of assets, (3) unauthorized modification of assets, (4) unautho-
rized disclosure of assets and (5) unauthorized modification of
assets.
Step 4
Step four is concerned with calculating the risk level of the
threats and thereby prioritizing risks. The list of prioritized
risks was submitted to the main stakeholders as an addition to
the earlier described ToE document. (This step has not been
finalized yet.)
VI. COMPARISON OF THE TWO APPROACHES
The main goal of the risk assessment for both stakeholders
in the value-web was to produce information that could be
used, preferably directly, as input to a Common Criteria eval-
uation. This puts some constraints on the expected outcome of
the risk assessment, and influenced how we carried out some
of the steps of the extended eTVRA. This is also the reason
why we decided to compare eTVRA with a more pragmatic
approach of security checklists derived from existing Protec-
tion Profiles (PP).
Fig. 6. ST/ToE and ST/PP activity chart.
Common Criteria recognizes two types of evaluations: (1)
ST/ToE evaluation and (2) ST/PP evaluation. ST denotes the
Security Target. In case of an ST/ToE evaluation, specific
parts of the concrete IT product are defined into a Target of
Evaluation (ToE). On the other hand, PP is an implementation-
independent version of a particular IT product type, such
as SmartCards. This means that a PP can be looked upon
as a template for a type of IT products. Figure 6 shows
the different activities involved when carrying out ST/ToE
and ST/PP evaluations. The two types of evaluations are not
orthogonal as the output of ST/PP can serve as input for
ST/ToE.
To enable reuse, Common Criteria offers a registry where IT
product owners can choose to store documents from successful
PP or ST/ToE evaluation. It is from the PP registry that we
found the SmartCards PPs that we used for the alternative
methodology (PP-based methodology) described in the previ-
ous section.
In our case, the goal is to assess the ST/ToE to reach EAL
4 or 4+. Ideally, if the SmartCard PP [8] covered all aspects
of our IT product, it could have been used as a template
to produce the ST/ToE documents of the object in question.
However, as one always have to produce the ST-part and as the
ST is ToE dependent, there is always at least some adaptation
work needed, also in our case. To investigate the amount of
adaptation work and the quality of the output produced, we
performed a structured evaluation of the distance between the
results produced and the needed input for a ST/ToE evaluation.
This evaluation was done for both methodologies. Before
we discuss the result of this evaluation, we list the ST/ToE
requirements, which we use as evaluation criteria.
According to Common Criteria Part 1 [11], the mandatory
content of an ST/ToE is the following:
• ST introduction, containing three narrative descriptions of
the ToE on different levels of abstraction.
• Conformance claim, showing whether the ST claims
conformance to any PPs and/or packages (e.g. threat
lists), and if so, to which.
• Security problem definition, showing the threats, security
policies and assumptions that must be countered, enforced
and upheld by the ToE and its operational environment
(also referred to as security environment).
• Security objective, which includes the security objectives
for the ToE and the security objectives for the operational
environment of the ToE.
• Extended components definition, where new components
(i.e. not included in Common Criteria Part 2 [12] or
Common Criteria Part 3 [13]) may be defined. These new
components are needed to define extended functional and
extended assurance requirements.
• Security requirements, where a translation of the security
objectives for the ToE into a standardized language is
provided. That is, standardized according to the recom-
mendations in Common Criteria: security requirements
should clearly specify the security functions, to a level
where it is possible to directly check that these security
functions are actually implemented as specified and to
argue that they fulfill the security objective they address.
• ToE summary specification, showing how the security
functions specified are implemented in the ToE.
The PP-based approach (described in Section V) produced
a checklist of threat categories relevant for SmartCards. In
addition, we added threat categories relevant for the wireless
interface. Provided that the chosen PP has a good coverage
of the IT product (new SIM card in the context of the ARM
scenario), this approach should reduce at least the time, the
resources and possibly the cost needed to produce high quality
results in terms of usable input to ST/ToE evaluation according
to Common Criteria EAL 4 and 4+. The same can be said for
the extended eTVRA, as it has been developed and tailored
to produce information directly usable as input to a ST/ToE
evaluation, except for the EAL level. However, which of the
two approaches is more efficient (that is, offers a more efficient
underlying process) and which produces the highest quality
result in terms of coverage and match to the ST/ToE evaluation
information requirements is not clear and will be examined in
the sequel. Note that we do not discuss the quality of the result
in terms of its ability to pass an EAL 4 or 4+ evaluation, as
the evaluation has not been performed yet.
A. Evaluation of result quality for the PP-based approach
To simplify the evaluation of the PP-based approach, we
assumed full coverage and relevance for our IT-product. A PP
document has the same basic structure as a ST/ToE document.
However, the PP introduction is narrative and does not provide
the information necessary for a ST/ToE introduction. Thus,
this part had to be completely re-written in the form. For the
remaining parts, we had to add information for the wireless
interface and to tailor the contents of the PP document to
fit our IT product. We did so by adding new parts and by
re-formulating text for the conformance claim, the security
problem definition, the security objectives, the extended com-
ponents definition, and the security requirements. As a PP
document does not include a ToE summary specification, this
part had to be made from scratch. We could reuse a substantial
amount of the existing PP text (about 40%) and we also got
help in putting together the security controls necessary for the
new SIM card.
We believe that this result holds in general whenever
there is a close match between an existing PP and the IT
product. Therefore, if those conditions are met, it is more
time and resource efficient to follow the alternative approach
described in Section V. Otherwise the PP-based approach is
not more efficient that extended eTVRA. We based this last
consideration on the experience we gained from the AMR
case study, without a formal evaluation. In addition, the PP-
based approach did not identify any of the added security
challenges (e.g. the public key functionalities or the key
management protocol issues) which needed extra attention
from the management perspective, as the roles of the two
actors were not clearly defined.
B. Evaluation of result quality for the extended eTVRA
The extended eTVRA produced most of the underlying
information needed for the ST/ToE document. However, the
output had to be re-formulated to fit the ST/ToE document
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF THE TWO METHODOLOGIES
Extended eTVRA PP-based approach
KPI(1): n. of threats 77 48
KPI(2): n. of abstraction layers 6 2
KPI(3): man-hours employed 310 68
requirements. Step 1 of extended eTVRA produced the goal
and scope statements, which could easily be reused in a
ST/ToE evaluation. Furthermore, it also identified which EAL
to target and the ToE boundaries, that is, which parts of the IT
product were in the scope. The SWOT and the semi-structured
interviews in Step 1 also brought to light cross-organizational
challenges due to the value-web configuration. Finally, the ToE
document in Section IV-A, produced as output from Step 1,
is at a level that made it easy to formulate the necessary ToE
abstraction levels required for the ST/ToE introduction.
C. Summary of evaluation results
To summarize, the extended eTVRA produced richer in-
formation, but the output was not as tailored and directly
reusable as that produced by the PP-based approach. However,
we identified more threats using the extended eTVRA. To
make a comparison which encompassed both the result quality
and process efficiency, we identified three Key Performance
Indicators (KPIs): (i) number of relevant threats identified
during the risk assessment, (ii) number of abstraction layers
in the threat hierarchy built during the risk assessment and
(iii) number of man-hours employed to carry out the risk
assessment. KPIs (i) and (ii) express the quality of the results
in terms of result quality and result presentation quality, while
KPI (iii) measures the efficiency of the underlying process of
each approach. To measure the number of hours employed we
assumed a working day of 8 hours. Table I summarizes the
methodology comparison.
The results of the comparison indicates that a risk assess-
ment following the extended eTVRA delivers better results
(∼37%) than the PP-based approach in that it produces a richer
and more product-specific result. The main reason for this is
that by using the extended eTVRA, and the supporting risk
identification and analysis methods as described in Section IV,
we can benefit of the creativity of the risk analyst and the
stakeholders involved. This most often means that the risk
identification is attacked from several viewpoints.
Moreover, in the presentation of the results produced from
the PP-approach we only used two levels of abstraction. This is
in contrast with the six-layer incident hierarchy resulting from
the extended eTVRA. In general, having more layers is not
always beneficial. However, for the critical components of an
IT product, more layers ease the evaluation job of the Common
Criteria evaluator: the six layers in the fault tree give a deeper
knowledge into how incidents may arise and thus also in how
incidents can be prevented. On the other hand, such detailed
results may not be necessary for less critical components or
assets and is both time and resource demanding. At present,
there is no consensus on when a richer layer is beneficial.
What should also be noted is that the PP-based approach
is five times more efficient in time spent on identifying
threats than the extended eTVRA methodology. This makes
the former more favorable than the latter in cases where time,
resources and budget are limited or when the market window
is relatively short in time. Additional instructions in which
the PP-approach works better is, when a limited ST/ToE is
sufficient (only small parts of the IT product are evaluated),
when targeting a low EAL (EAL 2 or 3) or when the PP is
not used to support a ST/ToE evaluation but merely as domain
knowledge.
VII. LESSONS LEARNED
The lessons learnt from the AMR case are many. They are
both related to the result quality and process efficiency as
discussed in the previous section and to how the extended
eTVRA enables the communication needed in each step and
whether it produced the information required as input for the
next step in the methodology. This is particularly challenging
in a value-web context. We have discussed the former in the
previous section, so here we report on (i) communication and
(ii) information on a value-web context.
A. Communication
The industrial context with two relatively different com-
panies collaborating in a value web affected the quality of
the communication throughout the assessment. One of the
companies was a relatively small hardware producer new on
the Telco market. Its goals with the development project were
thus naturally rather different than that of the second stake-
holder: the large Telco company. A small company usually
has limited monetary and human resources and when such a
company is new to a market, the essence is to produce a good
quality product and to get penetration in the new domain. A
big international player with many years in the market could
care less about time and market penetration issues, as it does
not depend on a single product for market visibility and cash
flow. However, they two stakeholders have a common goal in
the development project and that is to produce a high quality
product.
We experienced some communication difficulties that we
believe are due to the configuration of the value-web. First,
it seems that there was no clear agreements, neither internal
to each stakeholder or across the two organizations, regarding
which information was company internal, company confiden-
tial or open to everybody involved in the value-web. This
made it challenging to carry out assessment sessions where
both stakeholders were involved. Also, the distribution of
assignments within the development project seemed to have
been shifted a bit since the start-up of the project due to
technical difficulties.
We also experienced that it was much easier to get the com-
munication flowing when interacting with each stakeholder
separately, than it was in sessions where both were present.
This could be due to the tight deadline phase that the project
was in at the time of the assessment, but it could also be a
general observation that is valid outside of the AMR case.
What worked well were the semi-structured interviews in
Step 1 of the extended eTVRA and the separately executed risk
identification sessions in Step 3. The common brainstorming
sessions ware less successful. We have identified two main
reasons for this: (i) unspoken communication restrictions and
(ii) possible unsuitability of Security-HazOp for risk identifi-
cation in a value-web context.
Un-spoken communication restrictions refer to the first
evaluation criteria listed in Section II-C. Both stakeholders had
unspoken goals and expectations, that out of strategic reasons
where kept hidden even though they would help clarifying
some of the security challenges that were discussed.
Additional communication difficulties arose from poor man-
agement of tacit knowledge, and poor alignment between own
vision of role and others’ expectations [22]. This is further
explored in Section VII-B.
When it comes to Security-HazOp and whether the method
is efficient for risk identification in a value-web context, we
made some observations that deserve further investigation. In
particular, brainstorming sessions with all involved stakehold-
ers were not effective due to the reasons mentioned above: hid-
den goals, assumptions and expectations. However, we believe
it should be possible to adapt Security-HazOp to allow tacit
information to be revealed in a non-threatening manner so that
relevant stakeholders do not feel unconformable. Furthermore,
confidential information should always remain secret, even if
its disclosure is in the best interest of the project. We believe
this issue deserves further investigation before any conclusion
can be drawn.
B. Information
Information is crucial for the quality of risk assessment
results and for the efficiency of risk assessment methodologies.
If information is missing or if there are problems in interpret-
ing it, the results produced will be poor.
As always in development projects, not much information
is available in the early stages of the development. That
was also true for the AMR case. In particular, information
is often not made explicit at these early stages and people
are not often aware of the knowledge they possess or how
it can be valuable to others. Tacit knowledge is considered
more valuable because it provides context for people, places,
ideas, and experiences. Effective transfer of tacit knowledge
generally requires extensive personal contact and trust. For
risk management it is necessary to gain some understanding
of the deployment scenarios to make security decisions, so it
is important to extract the hidden knowledge.
In the AMR case, we extracted tacit knowledge through
the semi-structural interviews. That is, we first made guesses
based on the scarce information available and then asked
the stakeholders their opinion on our guesses as a kick-off
for the semi-structured interview. Then we tried to use the
stakeholders feedback to structure our own thoughts and to
arrive at a preliminary understanding of the intended behavior
and deployment of the new SIM card for the AMR scenario.
The reference architecture and the functional components
of the new SIM card that was given us during Step 1 of
the extended eTVRA methodology is an example of implicit
information. The diagram in itself did not give the risk
analysts much information, as they did not have the required
domain knowledge. The added information given in the semi-
structured interview ensured that the diagram made sense,
and could be used to articulate the security objectives. In a
similar manner, we used at Step 4 of the extended eTVRA
methodology the list of assets combined with our knowledge
about the information flow to transfer the implicit knowledge
on the threats and vulnerabilities into explicit knowledge.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented an extension of eTVRA and compared
it with a more pragmatic PP-based approach on a concrete
test-case as tools for producing quality results for a ST/ToE
Common Criteria evaluation. The two approaches were eval-
uated in terms of result quality and process efficiency. The
result of the evaluation is that if a suitable PP exists and if the
ToE has a rather limited scope, the PP-based approach is at
least more time effective, maybe also more resource and cost
effective. However, it produces a more narrative result than
that of the extended eTVRA approach. We argue that which
of the two approaches is more suitable for a particular case
depends on the goal of the risk assessment and possibly on
the targeted EAL in case of a ST/ToE evaluation.
We have extended eTVRA with a context identification step.
The decision on this extension was based on previous expe-
rience with eTVRA in which we show that without context
definition it is hard to keep threat identification sessions, and
in particular brainstorming sessions, targeted and focused.
We also extended eTVRA with methodology recommen-
dations for threat identification and incident documentation
borrowed from Security-HazOp and FTA. Security-HazOp is
a security specific adoption of HazOp, which has been in
use in the safety domain for several decades. HazOp is well
tested and well structured and, when adequate guide-words
are selected, proved to be an effective threat identification
brainstorming tool. The same can be said for FTA, which
showed to produce an adequate set of abstraction levels.
Future work includes finalizing the risk assessment of the
new SIM card in the context of the AMR scenario, carry out
more risk assessments using the extended eTVRA to get a
better overview of the efficiency of the underlying process of
the methodology and to give more detailed recommendations
on how to produce high-quality results. The latter refers to
the degree that the output can be used directly in a ST/ToE
document for a ST/ToE evaluation according to Common
Criteria. We also plan to investigate how value-webs introduce
challenges in risk assessments and how contracts can be used
to cope with them.
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